When Joseph Stalin died on March 3, 1953, the collective response was swift and dramatic as the loss of the leader of the Soviet Union seemed an unfathomably devastating occurrence. The chaos and uncertainty that occurred at his funeral, in which many were crushed to death by the “whirlpool of the crowd” (Evtushenko), was symbolic of the turmoil and uncertainty that would follow in coming years. As Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union, there began a period of “De-Stalinization”, in which he attempted to distance himself and the country from the legacy of Stalin’s reign.
With his “Secret Speech” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, Khrushchev made explicitly clear the he held disdain for Stalin and indicated that a return to Leninism was necessary to unify and further the Soviet Union. Heavily critical of what he viewed as perversions of party politics, he railed against Stalin’s political purges, which led to many of his political enemies being put in labor camps or killed. In particular, Khrushchev in particular cited the “cult of personality” which led him to be perceived as a “superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god” (The Cult of the Individual, Khruschev) by the masses and those around him, which allowed Stalin’s notorious actions to go unquestioned.
However, the speech elicited very mixed reactions from party members, initially “distress, outrage and confusion” (Jones 42). Not only was there open internal dissent and criticism of the party’s past being explicated, but it was coming from the top and being directed at a leader who had been worshipped for many years. As the speech began to disseminate, its presentation began to vary wildly (sometimes omitting critiques of Stalin, other times exaggerating them). These loose interpretations were floating about signaled a stark change in party policy. Not only would the immediate reaction be that of iconoclastic destruction of Stalin imagery around the country, but even expression open anti-Soviet sentiment going unrepudiated.
With the above in mind, my questions are: What was the significance of immediate “de-Stalinization” in terms of the current (circa mid-1950s) state of of the Soviet Union and how would it evolve and influence the Soviet Union in years to come? Most importantly, Was the allowance of lack of unity regarding party line on Stalin and allowance of dissent and iconoclasm a calculated move by Khrushchev and company? And was it the proper/most effective way to progress forward (and if not, how could/should it have been handled differently?
It’s hard to say how de-Stalinization influenced the Soviet Union in the years to come – I, at least, haven’t done the reading beyond what we were assigned.
It seems like the lack of party unity wasn’t purposeful — Jones writes that the party later “learned its lesson” about political dissent, as well as the fact that instructions were given out (there should first be outrage, then intellectual reflection would replace the fervor); the instructions just didn’t work as planned.
De-Stalinization can be called the “proper” way to move forward if the goal of moving forward is to remove your administration from what Stalin’s administration worked for (this seems to be what Kruschev was working towards). It’s hard to remove yourself from the past without first acknowledging and discrediting it. But looking at effectiveness — it isn’t. Even if there had been better instructions and a clearer plan, people would understandably react in a variety of ways, and to take the worship of Stalin and completely destroy that, is messy.
I believe Khrushchev should have gone further following the death of Stalin, regardless of what it would have meant for the Soviet state. State censorship and other restrictions ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union long term, and, more specifically, ultimately led to an inefficient, stagnant, and corrupt government. Had Khrushchev effectively seized the moment, I believe the stagnancy of the Brezhnev period could have been averted.
I don’t know if Stalinism would have been sustainable for longer than it lasted. With the secret speech, at least Khrushchev could control the transition out of Stalinism.
Despite the fact that Khrushchev denounced Stalin, I would argue that the Soviet Union still remained a Stalinist state to the extent that it was run by a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, as opposed to a dictatorship of the proletariat, which was the ultimate goal of both Lenin and Trotsky. It’s interesting how, in the Secret Speech, Khrushchev denounces Stalin, but also denounces Trotsky and other members of the opposition to Stalin. This indicates that while the new regime was against some of the most violent aspects of Stalinism, such as the purges, it still kept onto the core principles of Stalinism (namely a rejection of internationalism and the implementation of a very rigid bureaucracy)
In ways, the disunity of the party in the wake of Stalin’s death, if not planned, was probably at least purposefully allowed. Stalin purged so many for dissent real or otherwise, and what better way to put one’s money where one’s mouth was and prove they were moving past Stalinism than allow people to react how they wished?
I would say that the Secret Speech was beneficial because in it, Khrushchev put forth a tone about how the country would be run. Not only did he tell the people what he would be doing, but he also gave reasons why and one of them being his dislike for Stalin.