Per Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics by other means. In the summer of 1917 during the height of political turmoil, Alexander Kerensky launched a new major offensive in Galicia (now a part of Poland and Ukraine) to build support for the provisional government through a military victory. The previous summer, the Russian Imperial Army had launched the Brusilov offensive (named after its commander General Alexei Brusilov), which, for a time, was a major success, nearly breaking the Austro-Hungarian army, until delays in support from neighboring Russian units allowed the Central Powers to regroup and counterattack. The overall failure of the Brusilov offensive, in turn, led to decreasing morale in the Russian Imperial Army. This in turn led to the primary weakness of the Kerensky offensive: desertions and mutiny. However, would the success of either of these offensives prevented the Revolution of 1917, or were the gears already in motion regardless of military success in the Great War?
The Kornilov affair occurred 100 years ago last week. It was centered around General Lavr Kornilov, who was given command of the forces of the Petrograd Military District (originally the Petersburg Military District created by Dmitriy Milyutin) following the February Revolution, and eventually appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army by Alexander Kerensky. The affair began with a radio address by Kerensky stating that Kornilov had demanded that Kerensky cede control of the government to him. Kornilov fired back, stating Kerensky was lying and was now controlled by Bolshevik elements working in lockstep with the German government (Germany had also recently captured Riga following the collapse of the Russian Army following the Kerensky offensive). Three cavalry divisions under Kornilov’s command were sent to capture Petrograd, and Kerensky appealed to the Petrograd Soviet for assistance. The Soviet began arming its members, allegedly for self-defense. Kornilov’s coup failed, with his soldiers, delayed and confused by members of the proletariat, eventually breaking cohesion outside Petrograd with no major engagement. Kornilov’s failure was almost immediately followed up by the October Revolution’s success. Would the successful establishment of a military dictatorship (as Kornilov desired) have led to stability in Russia? How did the Bolsheviks learn and benefit from the Kornilov affair?
The Bolshevik faction was becoming increasingly a military as well as political organization following the arming of the Red Guard. Fitzpatrick writes that, “The Communists who had served in the Red Army brought military jargon into the language of party politics, and made the army tunic and boots-worn even by those who had stayed in civilian posts or been too young to fight-almost a uniform for party members in the 1920s and early 1930s,” and “the Bolsheviks had associated themselves with armed confrontation and violence in the months between February and October 1917” (pp. 71-72). How did the Bolshevik’s militarism lead to their success?
I would say that militarism in the Bolshevik party was not a result of the Karnilov affair, but rather due to the Civil War. Remember that the October Revolution was almost bloodless. Additionally, during the Civil War, the Bolsheviks proved to be a well oiled military machine once Trotsky introduced compulsory conscription for the army. Before that, the Bolsheviks controlled a part of Russian territory that was no larger that the medieval Muscovite Principality.
I’d argue with all of the context we have surrounding discontent with the monarchy, serfdom, general unfair living conditions for large segments of the population, and radicalism/extremism, the wheels were already turning.
A successful Kornilov affair would have been a mild stopgap in the political changes that were to happen in Russia – one military victory wouldn’t have changed how much influence Bolshevism had over the population and said population’s propensity for acting in the name of that influence.
The Bolsheviks’ increasing militarism was definitely one of the most important pieces of their success. Combined with the popular support (from the proletariat) they had on their side, that increasing militarism was a big factor that led to their eventual success. Popular support isn’t much when you can’t win a war proper if push comes to shove.